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Abstract 
This essay addresses the role of transaction cost economics (TCE) in 
advancing the resource-based view.   In particular, it is argued that TCE has 
the potential to remedy a number of weak spots in the RBV, such as the 
absence of attention in the RBV to the interaction between value creation and 
value appropriation.  This and other weak spots in the RBV stem from not 
taking account of transaction costs to a sufficient extent.  Integrating TCE 
with the RBV adds new insight into the analysis of sustained competitive 
advantage.   
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I. Introduction 
For a long time, the strategic management field was fairly sympathetic to work in 
economics on transaction costs and their role in structuring economic organization.1 At 
least until the mid-1990s, many accepted that “[w]ithin strategic management, 
transaction cost economics is the ground where economic thinking, strategy, and 
organizational theory meet” (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1994: 28).  In particular, the 
work of Oliver Williamson (Williamson 1975, 1985) was heavily cited and used.  
However, during the 1990s, transaction cost economics (henceforth, “TCE”) became 
increasingly subject to critical discussion, and even became something of a favorite 
Prügelknabe for many a strategy scholar. Writers associated with resource-based, 
capabilities, knowledge-based, etc. approaches have been particularly vocal critics, and 
have explicitly used the critique of TCE as a starting point for developing their own 
approaches to the firm (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992; Conner and Prahalad 1996; 
Ghoshal and Moran 1996).  In complete contrast to these writers, the central contention 
of this paper is that the resource-based view (henceforth, the “RBV”) needs transaction 
cost insights in order to take the next step in its evolution.  Note that the attention in 
this paper is on what may be called the “pure” RBV, exemplified by such writers as 
Barney (1991) and Peteraf (1993), and not on the various related approaches such as 
dynamic capabilities or competence approaches.  
 For the purposes of this paper, we take TCE to be founded on the notion that 
there are costs of exchanging, protecting and capturing property rights (Barzel 1997).  
Property rights over resources consist of the rights to consume, obtain income from, 
and alienate these resources. Less abstractly, transaction costs depend on, for example, 
such transactions characteristics as specificity and measurability. Agents are assumed 
                                                 
1 In addition to Williamson’s work, this kind of work also includes other parts of new institutional 
economics, notably property rights economics (e.g., Barzel 1997), as well as various contributions to 
contract theory (e.g., Holmström and Tirole 1989; Hart 1995).  In the present paper I refer to all of this 
work as “transaction cost economics.”  This may be somewhat imprecise, but may be defended by “new 
institutional economics” being a much less well-established term in strategic management than 
transaction cost economics. See Furubotn and Richter (1997) for a general presentation of the new 
institutional economics. 
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to try to economize with these costs. This involves choices between alternative 
contracts, governance structures and institutions for organizing transactions with 
different characteristics.  While this characterization of course includes Williamson’s 
approach, it is not restricted to it.   In fact, it is arguable that over-concentration on the 
part of the critics of TCE on specific (Williamsonian) parts (i.e., opportunism and asset 
specificity) the overall body of TCE arguments has led to a corresponding lack of 
appreciation of the large potential reach of basic TCE arguments in strategy research 
(Foss 2003).2    
 It will be argued in this paper that TCE arguments are fundamentally important 
to strategy research in general, and to the RBV in particular.   In order to develop this 
argument, we first briefly assess the RBV, and identify a number of weaknesses in the 
present version of this approach that may be ascribed to insufficiently taking account 
of transaction costs (“The Resource-based View: Key Tenets, Recent Evolution, and Selected 
Weaknesses”). We then sketch a transaction cost research program that harmonizes with 
the RBV, and suggests specific ways in which TCE furthers RBV (“Enter Transaction 
Costs”).      
II.   The Resource-based View:                                              
Key Tenets, Recent Evolution, and Selected Weaknesses 
 
Key Tenets of the RBV 
 The dominant contemporary approach to the analysis of sustained competitive 
advantage is the RBV, initiated in the mid-1980s by Wernerfelt (1984), Rumelt (1984) 
and Barney (1986), and further developed by these and other writers.  Economic 
equilibrium, particularly in the form of “competitive equilibrium” (i.e., equilibrium 
under perfectly competitive conditions), is central in this approach (Foss 2003).  
Indeed, it is arguable that it is not until the advent of the RBV that the key issue of 
strategic management becomes framed as the problem of achieving sustained 
                                                 
2 Admittedly, transaction cost scholars themselves are partly to blame, because most applied TCE in 
economics as well as in management studies has only pursued a Williamsonian research agenda, with 
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competitive advantage in the sense of earning efficiency rents in equilibrium.3 In 
developing this view, the RBV owes a heavy debt to the Chicago School in industrial 
organization, as has been argued elsewhere in some detail (Foss 2000, 2003), 
 The fundamentals of the RBV are now familiar, and may be very briefly stated by 
means of the reference to Peteraf’s (1993) excellent summarizing paper.4 This is a paper 
in which the equilibrium orientation of the RBV are very clearly brought out, right 
down to the accompanying diagrams that illustrate competitive advantage in terms of 
a conventional demand and supply apparatus where a firm is portrayed as a having a 
sustained competitive advantage because of lower costs of production due to some 
inimitable technological resource (as in Lippman and Rumelt 1982). 
  According to Peteraf, resources yield a SCA to the firm that controls them when 
they meet four conditions:  
… four conditions underlie competitive advantage, all of which must be met.  
These include superior resources (heterogeneity within an industry), ex post 
limits to competition, imperfect resource mobility and ex ante limits to 
competition.  
While heterogeneity is not precisely defined in Peteraf (1993), indications of its 
meaning are given by arguing that resource bundles differ across firms in terms of 
efficiencies and that these different efficiencies give rise to different levels of value 
creation. These efficiency differences may translate into differences in rents.  While 
heterogeneity is the condition under which a firm may generate a rent/differential 
profit, the remaining three conditions are sufficient to realize these rents and make 
them sustainable. Thus, “ex ante barriers” means that factor markets do not 
appropriate all of the rent from a resource (Barney 1986); “imperfect mobility” means 
that not all of the rent differential is eliminated through factor market competition (i.e., 
factors appropriating all of the surplus); and the condition of “ex post barriers” means 
                                                                                                                                                           
its over-riding emphasis on asset specificity and opportunism. 
3 This is a special case of a broader view that “[t]he field of strategy is concerned with the conditions 
under which the microeconomic equilibrium of homogenous firms with zero profits can be overcome” 
(Knott 1998: 3).   
4  For a comparison of Peteraf (1993) to Barney (1991), see Foss and Knudsen (2003).   
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that the rent differential is not eliminated through product market competition (e.g., 
Dierickx and Cool 1989).5  
Recent Evolution of the RBV 
 Peteraf’s identification of the four “cornerstones” of sustained competitive 
advantage provides a first way to put the strengths and weaknesses of the RBV into 
perspective, as well as to describe the evolution of the RBV.  
 Heterogeneity. It has often been argued that the work of Penrose (1959) is the 
single most important precursor of the RBV.6 In terms of the Peteraf cornerstones 
distinction, Penrose’s main interest was in pinning out the notion of firm heterogeneity 
in terms of the services that can be derived from resources, and there is little in her 
discussion that relates to the other cornerstones.  In fact, her work is not about 
competitive advantage at all.  Still, it can be argued that Penrose’s contribution 
represents the first sustained attempt to argue for the importance to strategic analysis 
of resource heterogeneity,  and that the RBV is thoroughly Penrosian in the sense that 
it makes the same argument for resource heterogeneity.  Given this, the causes of firm 
heterogeneity have been surprisingly under-researched in the RBV, given that the 
approach is supposed to start out from this condition, and that part of the marketing 
effort of RBV scholars has been to argue that the RBV in contrast to industrial 
organization economics places firm heterogeneity centerstage.  It is perhaps telling that 
a recent special issue of the Strategic Management Journal  (October 2003) on the RBV 
was (sub)titled “Towards a Theory of Competitive Heterogeneity”!   
 Ex post barriers to competition. Lippman and Rumelt (1982), Rumelt (1984) and 
Wernerfelt (1984) added the cornerstone of “ex post barriers” (although their respective 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately, Peteraf is not entirely forthcoming about whether her conditions constitute the 
minimum set of jointly necessary conditions for SCA, or whether they are individually necessary 
conditions, or whether they are merely collectively sufficient for SCA.  However, she does say that all 
conditions must be met (Peteraf 1993: ), that the four conditions are “related” (p.185), that heterogeneity 
is “necessary for sustainable advantage but not sufficient,” and that we require “ex post limits to 
competition as well.”  Because the conditions are related, Peteraf spends some time explaining how the 
meeting of one condition may mean that another one is also met.  She does, however, not say that the 
four conditions constitute the bare minimum necessary (and sufficient) conditions for SCA, and guards 
her discussion by saying that the four conditions are “distinct,” yet “related.” 
6 For an attempt to contest this view, see Foss (2000). 
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terminologies differed from this).  This gave rise to a spate of work, of which Dierickx 
and Cool’s (1989) short, but extremely influential, discussion still stands out, and 
which was taken up with examining 1) the generic mechanisms that may sustain 
competitive advantage (e.g., Dierickx and Cool 1989; Reed and DeFilippi 1990) and 2) 
classify resources on the basis of their potential contribution to sustainability (e.g., 
Grant 1991).  Notable empirical work has also grown out of this focus, such as Miller 
and Shamsie’s (1996) discussion of the sources and sustainability of competitive 
advantage in the Hollywood film studios in terms of “property-“ and “knowledge-
based” resources.  
 Ex ante barriers to competition. Barney (1986) established the cornerstone of “ex 
ante barriers” to competition with his strategic factor market argument, that is, the 
argument that informational asymmetries are needed to produce that divergence 
between resource price and discounted net present value that is a condition of 
competitive advantage.  Some of the most innovative recent work in the RBV has been 
the refinements and extensions of this argument, notably in the works of Richard 
Makadok (e.g., Makadok and Barney 2001; Makadok 2003).  Thus, Makadok and 
Barney (2001) develop the Barney (1986) factor market argument into a story of 
information acquisition in which the ultimate determinant of competitive advantage is 
the firm’s skill at researching the future value of resources.  
 Immobility. The perhaps least examined cornerstone has, until rather recently, 
been that of “immobility.”  The notion that those input owners whose services are 
regularly acquired by the firm (notably employees) have bargaining powers and that 
the distribution of these powers determine how surplus is split, surfaced rather lately 
in the RBV (although Wernerfelt 1989 was quite explicit about it).7 Russell Coff’s (1997, 
1999) work in particular has drawn attention to this.  Lippman and Rumelt (2003b) 
show how game theoretical bargaining theory may inform an RBV perspective on how 
rents are split between resource owners.   
                                                 
7  Perhaps this is because immobility is hard to distinguish from factor market competition, and may be 
placed under “ex ante barriers to competition.”  Surprisingly, while bargaining power has been 
important in connection with “immobility,” it has played no role in connection with the “ex ante barriers 
to competition” cornerstone (leading to the incorrect conclusion that with perfect factor markets, the 
supply side will always appropriate all rent).  
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 Thus, it is apparent that some of the cornerstones have attracted more attention 
than other ones, and that the theoretical evolution of the RBV during the last twenty 
years is a matter of 1) gradually expanding the understanding of the determinants of 
sustained competitive advantage in the sense of incorporating more determinants and 
2) refining the analysis of each individual determinant (i.e., “cornerstone”).   The RBV 
has not yet completed this evolution.  Thus, disproportionate attention has been paid 
to, notably, the “ex post barriers to competition” condition, usually in the form of  
trying to clarify which resource attributes make resources costly to imitate.  However, 
as will be argued, the understanding of this condition is still incomplete.       
Some Shortcomings of the Resource-based View 
 Looking back at the twenty years of evolution of the RBV, it is easy to jump to the 
conclusion that the application of economic equilibrium theory (of the specific Chicago 
School variety, e.g., Demsetz 1973) in many ways furthered the field by reconciling 
strategic management and industrial organization economics in a way entirely 
different from Michael Porter’s (1980).  It expanded the vocabulary and the toolbox of 
the strategy field significantly by introducing efficiency rents, factor market 
imperfections, costly-to-imitate resources and other Chicago insights. However, this 
came at a price: Unwanted excess baggage was also introduced in the strategy field.   
 The excess baggage in question is the competitive equilibrium (or “perfect 
competition”) model with its many constraining assumptions (Hayek 1948; Machovec 
1995; Makowski and Ostroy 2001; Foss 2003). The competitive equilibrium that are 
used in RBV core contributions (such as Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Barney 1991; 
Peteraf 1993) may not entirely be of the perfect competition textbook variety. For 
example, some superior technology may be costly to imitate (Demsetz 1973; Lippman 
and Rumelt 1982) or there may be some asymmetric information in factor markets 
(Demsetz 1973; Barney 1986). Still, the basic model is one of instantaneous market 
clearing in markets populated by traders with no bargaining power, and firms that – 
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within a given industry – are essentially identical.   We can see the legacy of the 
competitive equilibrium model in a number of the shortcomings of the RBV.8      
 No theory of the firm.  The view of the firm in the competitive model is what 
Williamson (1996) calls the “production function view,” which is an important part of 
the neoclassical theory of production, as stated in basic economics textbooks.  While 
this view has been contrasted with the RBV (e.g., Conner 1991), it is not clear what 
exactly is the difference between saying that the firm is a production function and 
saying that the firm is a bundle of resources.  True, “resources are heterogeneous” in 
the RBV whereas “inputs are (usually) homogeneous” in the production function 
view. But the latter assumption is simply made for calculational convenience. The 
production function describes the relation between inputs, that is, resources, and 
output, and such a production function may of course be constructed for any firm 
(Wernerfelt 2003). It is not logically committed to an assumption of resource 
homogeneity. In fact, some of the critical assumptions of the production function carry 
over to the RBV.  
 From a TCE point of view, there are two problems with the production function 
view. First, it contains no predictions with respect the optimum scope of the firm 
(Teece 1982; Williamson 1996).9 Second, it assumes what should be explained, namely 
that input factors (resources) are optimally used inside a firm. Because its view of 
productive activities is not essentially different from that of the production function 
view, the RBV similarly contains no implications for the optimum scope of the firm 
and similarly works from the assumption that resources are optimally used inside the 
firm. Differences in competitive advantages are therefore not a matter of how well 
resources are organized or managed, but of the inherent efficiencies of the resources 
that firms control.  This means that there is little or no attention to the managerial task 
or to organizational matters in the RBV. To talk of the “resource-based view of the 
firm” may therefore a bit of a misnomer, because the RBV says very little about firm 
                                                 
8  Foss (2003) discusses other shortcomings.  Lippman and Rumelt (2003a) focus on the partial 
equilibrium nature of much RBV reasoning.   
9  Relatedly, it is hard to see what is distinctly resource-based about Conner and Prahalad’s (1996) 
“resource-based theory of the firm.” 
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organization and because it is not clear how the view fundamentally differs from basic 
economic production theory.   
 Neglect of the interaction between value creation and value capture.  It is a key 
insight of economics that determining the size of the pie is something different from 
dividing the pie, and that dividing the pie may influence the size of the pie.   
Economists often conceptualize this insight – which, as we shall later see, only holds 
true if (some) transaction costs are positive -- in terms of interaction between allocation 
(creating value) and distribution (dividing value). It is crucially important for 
understanding the economic implications of reward systems and the allocation of 
property rights. Much of the modern economic theory of the firm revolves around it, 
the “hold up problem” (Hart 1995; Williamson 1996) being an important manifestation 
of the expected sharing of surplus impacting on the creation of that surplus (through 
the effect on investment incentives). And, yet, it is an insight that is conspicuously and 
surprisingly absent from the RBV.   
 Important recent work by Russell Coff (1997, 1999) and Lippman and Rumelt 
(2003) has done much to introduce and refine the understanding of how rents are split 
through bargaining processes between the various resource owners.   However, even 
this work fails to connect the splitting of rents to the creation of rents. There are a 
number of unfortunate consequences of this.  First, incentives for creating value are 
not fully understood.  Second, the dissipation of value caused by resource owners 
fighting for larger distributional shares cannot be represented.   Third, the notion that 
value may be created by “getting the incentives” right and by reducing dissipation of 
value cannot be captured by the RBV.   
 Incomplete identification of relevant resources.  Because of the above points, the 
RBV identifies only a subset of the resources that may be strategically relevant, that is, 
cause those efficiency differences that may give rise to sustained competitive 
advantages.  Thus, implicit adherence to the production function view means that 
there can be no differences in the efficiency with which resources are managed and 
organized.  And neglect of the interaction between value creation and value capture 
means that firms cannot gain a sustained competitive advantage from better 
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controlling dissipation and offering better incentives.   Thus, HRM practices or reward 
systems disappear from the set of potentially strategic resources.  So do seemingly 
mundane practices, such as packaging, sorting, etc.   
 To illustrate, consider the strategy that a major player in the World’s diamond 
industry, the DeBeers cartel has adopted for organizing sales to its customers. The 
customer informs DeBeers of his or her wishes with respect to the number and quality 
of stones. DeBeers then offers the customer a packet of stones, a “sight,” that roughly 
corresponds to the customer’s wishes. The sight is offered on a “take-it-or-leave-us-
permanently” basis.  The price is calculated on the basis of the gross characteristics of 
the stones, and no negotiation over the price is possible.   
 Economists (Barzel 1982; Roy and Kenney 1983) writing from the perspective of 
transaction cost economics argue that these practices – that look conspicuously like 
monopolistic abuse – are instruments of maximizing the created value in firm-
customer relations by reducing the costs customers otherwise would have expended 
on sorting and negotiating.  Sorting and bargaining costs are effectively eliminated, so 
that DeBeers’ practice maximizes the total created value that the parties to the 
transaction can split between them.  Similar arguments apply to practices such as pre-
packaging of food or block booking in the movie industry (Barzel 1982, 1997; Roy and 
Kenney 1983).   
 Such arguments are instances of the broader TCE proposition that agents when 
faced with potential reductions in the value they can derive from transactions will put 
mechanisms – such as sales practices (e.g., packaging and sorting), contracts, 
governance structures, organizational types, institutions – in place that reduce (if not 
eliminate) those losses by influencing the incentives of the participating agents 
(Akerlof 1970; Hart 1995; Williamson 1996; Furubotn and Richter 1997).  Williamson 
(1994) thinks that choices relating to these mechanisms are so fundamental that 
“economizing is the best strategy.” Presumably this is because governance and 
contractual choices are ubiquitous, must be made by all firms, and can have important 
impact on performance, whereas strategizing, which appeals to a market power 
perspective, is only open to major players (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997: 513).   
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Whatever that may be, the implication for the RBV seems clear: If a resource is 
“anything that may be thought of as an advantage to a firm,” the above mechanisms 
may be resources.     
Summing Up 
 The above shortcomings are selected ones in the sense that they have been chosen 
to illustrate a point; namely, that neglect of transaction costs leads to an incomplete 
understanding of the cornerstones of competitive advantage.  Thus, firm and resource 
heterogeneity is under-estimated because the absence of transaction cost reasoning in 
the RBV means that not all relevant resources are identified (or, if they are identified, it 
cannot be adequately explained why they are valuable) and that firms operate at the 
frontier of their production possibility sets. Heterogeneity can only be ascribed to 
differences in firms’ endowments (Foss and Knudsen 2003), not to the way in which 
these resources are organized and managed.   Because the interaction of value creation 
and value appropriation is not explicitly addressed the feedback loop from (expected) 
ex post competition to value creation is not addressed.  Ex post competition is limited to 
competition in terms of imitation and substitution (Barney 1991), and the (ex post) 
capture of value represented by moral hazard and adverse selection is not addressed 
(Foss and Foss 2004), because these phenomena can only take place in a positive 
transaction cost world. The Barney (1986) strategic factor argument (i.e., ex ante barriers 
to competition) is developed without reference to transaction costs.  Etc.   
 As Coase (1992: 716) notes: “Businessmen in deciding on their ways of doing 
business and on what to produce have to take into account transaction costs … In fact, 
a large part of what we think of as economic activity is designed to accomplish what 
high transaction costs would otherwise prevent.” Transaction costs should be an 
integral part of strategic management.  In particular, the following section discusses 
how transaction cost notions may further the RBV and contribute to remedying the 
above shortcomings.   
III. Enter Transaction Costs 
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The RBV and TCE 
 The argument that the RBV may be furthered by TCE insights is not a new one 
per se.  To mention just a few examples, Rumelt (1984) argued “... it appears obvious 
that the study of business strategy must rest on the bedrock foundations of the 
economist’s model of the firm” (1984: 557), by which he meant Williamsonian TCE.  
Teece’s (1982, 1986) work on corporate diversification and the organization of the 
innovative process made use of both TCE and RBV arguments.  Mahoney and Pandian 
(1992) argued that the TCE and the RBV were broadly complementary.  Williamson 
(1999) sketched a number of ways in which a contractual (TCE) focus may strengthen 
RBV reasoning.  Madhok (2002) made related points, but from the point of view of the 
RBV rather than TCE.  Following up on these methodological arguments, a number of 
recent contributions have integrated RBV and TCE insights in concrete empirical 
applications; for example, Silverman (1999) developed an integrated RBV-TCE 
framework in his approach to corporate diversification.  The present application of 
TCE to the RBV is, however, entirely different from the arguments in these papers.   
 Expositions of economic approaches to strategy often begin from the logic of the 
competitive equilibrium model (e.g., Oster 1999). One or two monkey wrenches ⎯ 
some kind of transaction or at least information costs ⎯ are then thrown into this 
perfect machinery so as to “explain” competitive advantage.  However as Makowski 
and Ostroy (2001: 529) note, “[w]ith the standard model as the point of departure, the 
simplicity of price-taking behavior leaves the perfect competitor unprepared for the 
entirely new strategic considerations he confront when transaction costs are positive.”  
Therefore, the relevant “imperfections” are introduced in a highly selective manner.  
For example, asymmetric information may be invoked on input markets, so that firms 
may acquire inputs at a price below their discounted net present values (Barney 1986).  
Or, firms entering an industry may draw from a distribution of technologies of 
different efficiencies, efficiency differences being sustained in equilibrium through 
invoking costs of imitating (superior) technologies (Lippman and Rumelt 1982). It has 
been argued elsewhere (Foss 2003) that an adherence to this approach has caused some 
of the shortcomings of the RBV, including not sufficiently taking note of transaction 
costs.  
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Coasian Methodology 
 The present approach (see also Foss 2003; Foss and Foss 2004) instead adopts a 
Coasian approach to reasoning about the causes of real-world phenomena in which 
there is no specific assumptions about, for example, market structure.  Boundary 
conditions instead relate to the presence of transaction costs.  More specifically, 
essentially the same strategy that Coase (1937, 1960) followed is advocated here for 
strategic management research: Examine an extreme setting (i.e., the Coase theorem 
setting) to see what this tells us about the phenomenon that we are interested in 
understanding (i.e., the firm (Coase, 1937), the law (Coase, 1960) and strategic 
management (this paper)), and then demonstrate that this understanding is furthered 
by the introduction of transaction costs, in fact, that transaction costs are necessary to 
make sense out of the relevant phenomenon.   
 A major point in Coase (1960) is that although economists have routinely 
assumed that transaction costs ⎯ that is, the cost of exchanging, protecting and 
capturing property rights ⎯ are zero, they have not really, and certainly not fully, 
examined the radical consequences of this assumption.  In order to drive this point – 
made in the context of the economic analysis of externalities – home, Coase supplied 
several analytical innovations.   
 One is that for many purposes, it is more useful to think of what is being 
exchanged in markets as property rights rather than physical goods per se.  Thus, when a 
firm buys a machine, its acquisition of ownership to the machine is simultaneously the 
acquisition of a whole bundle of property rights, such as the rights to use, derive 
income from, sell the machine, lease it out, etc. These rights are constrained not only 
by the law, but also by norms and by other means of private enforcement. One of the 
Coase’s most skilled followers, Yoram Barzel (1982, 1997), argues that goods 
(resources) are composed of “attributes,” that is, different functionalities and uses, and 
that property rights are defined to such attributes. For example, a Hi-Fi system can be 
used for playing different kinds of music, for manipulating the level of the bass, for 
playing loud, and so on. However, the functionality of a Hi-Fi system that allows it to 
deliver the service of playing extremely loud music may not be realized if the law or 
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neighborhood norms prevent these services. The use rights of the owner are 
constrained.  Usually, resource attributes are bundled because it would be too costly to 
specify them all in a contract (Foss and Foss 2001, 2004).  
 In the actual world, defining (e.g., writing contracts), exchanging, protecting (e.g., 
fencing a private parking space) and capturing (e.g., stealing) property rights are 
costly activities.  Coase famously argued that these costs underlie a host of institutions 
and institutional arrangements, including important aspects of the law.  This insight 
clearly harmonized with his earlier (Coase 1937) insight that the existence of the firm is 
rooted in the costliness of the price mechanism.   In order to develop this argument, 
Coase (1960) began from a zero cost setting, and traced the allocative consequences of 
different assignments of liability.  His conclusion, essentially what became famous as 
the “Coase theorem,” was that different assignments of liability would not matter to 
allocative efficiency. The law of liability can only make an allocative difference in a 
positive transaction cost regime; it has no rationale if transaction costs are zero, just as 
the firm has no economic rationale under those conditions.  The argument here is that 
exactly the same kind of reasoning may be used to develop insights into the economics 
of firm strategy, particularly the RBV. 
The Zero Transaction Cost Setting 
 The Coase Theorem as starting point.  One way of stating the Coase theorem is 
that in the absence of transaction costs, all the value that can conceivably be created 
from the exchange and use in production of the available resources in the economy 
will, in fact, be created. An underlying assumption is that in such a surplus-
maximizing equilibrium, players have full information (Barzel 1997). Therefore, there 
are no costs of bargaining and of measuring the attributes of resources, and property 
rights to (all attributes of) all resources are defined and protected at zero cost.  Because 
the costs of exchanging property rights are zero, all property rights to all attributes will 
be tradable.10 All rights will therefore move to their highest valued uses, so that the 
                                                 
10  For this reason, the very notion of a “resource,” strictly speaking, dissolves in this extreme world.  
Exchanges will only involve attributes.    
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total value that resources can create, and which therefore will be imputed to them, will 
be at its maximum.   
 If indeed bargaining costs are zero, the issue of value creation can furthermore be 
separated from that of the appropriation of value. Thus, we may imagine the parties to 
a contract to follow a two-step procedure in which they first agree on the mix of 
activities that maximize their joint surplus, and then in the next step split this surplus 
through the prices and side-payments that emerge from bargaining.  How they will 
split value, that is, how much value each agent can appropriate, will depend on a host 
of factors, and specific assumptions are necessary to derive insight into this (Lippman 
and Rumelt 2003b). Value may be divided in any possible way within the bounds 
given by opportunity costs and reservation prices. However, the Coase theorem 
implies that bargaining processes are instantaneous, consume no resources, and that 
there is no feedback effect from splitting value to creating value. Essentially, this 
implies that any organizational arrangement will be as efficient as any other (i.e., 
resulting in the same value creation).   
 Finally, just as the creation and splitting of value (i.e., the appropriation of value) 
presents no real problems, in the sense that these are costless processes in the Coasian 
setting, so the protection of value against other agents’ capture cannot be a problem 
either. This is because there will be no problem of protecting the value created in the 
coalition from, for example, would-be imitators, since in a zero transaction costs 
setting property rights can not only be costlessly exchanged but also costlessly 
protected (Barzel, 1997). Thus, zero costs of protection imply infinite costs of capturing 
property rights from other agents. 
 Strategic management when transaction costs are zero.  Much of what we 
understand by strategic management evaporates in a zero transaction cost world: 
Maximum value is created instantaneously, all rent streams are perfectly protected; 
bargaining over the division of these streams takes place instantaneously and 
costlessly; there are no problems of implementing a strategy (since organizational costs 
would be zero), etc. In sum, the creation and appropriation of value pose no problems 
whatsoever. Arguably, a significant part of the content of strategic management lies in 
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all these processes not being instantaneous, costless and unproblematic.  Settings such 
as the one underlying the Coase theorem (or its distant cousin, competitive 
equilibrium) leave very little room for genuine strategic choices.  Still, a starting point 
in a situation with zero transaction costs is helpful for at least two reasons: First, it 
indicates where we should make adjustments to obtain a more realistic understanding 
of strategic issues.  The relevant ”adjustments” are a matter of introducing transaction 
costs.  Second, it provides a benchmark (namely optimum resource allocation/value 
creation), relative to which we may asses changes in the real, positive transaction cost 
world.   
Implications for the RBV of Transaction Costs   
 Transaction costs and competitive advantage. The transaction costs of 
exchanging, protected and capturing property rights both directly and indirectly 
influence value creation.  For example, measurement and bargaining costs directly eat 
into created value.  So do costs expended on protecting property rights.  When the 
latter costs are positive, some agents will expend resources on capturing property 
rights controlled by other agents These costs in turn induce “deadweight welfare 
losses,” that is, some transactions that would have been concluded under zero 
transaction costs are not carried out (Akerlof, 1970; Williamson, 1996; Hart, 1995).  The 
emphasis on ex post competitive imitation in the RBV is one instance of capture of 
property rights, but there are many others.  For example, when forming expectations 
about future resource values (Makadok and Barney 2001), managers should not only 
assess the imitability of resources, but also the hold-up and moral hazard potential 
that may be associated with specific resources.   
Implication:  The contribution to competitive advantage of a resource depends not only on 
its use and its scarcity and the amount of competitive imitation, but also on the costs of 
controlling (other) property rights to the resource, that is, transaction costs.  Estimating 
competitive advantages must involve taking such costs into account.  
Getting to grips with how transaction costs influence (expected) competitive 
advantages will allow RBV scholars to establish the link between value creation and 
appropriation that is currently not explored in the RBV. The reason that it is 
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transaction costs that establish this link (i.e., with zero transaction costs, creating and 
appropriating value are independent processes). This will bring economic organization 
(the theory of the firm) much more directly into the picture, because, loosely, contracts 
and governance structures serve to maximize created value, given transaction costs.   
 Transaction costs and ex post competition.  The general point about the potential 
importance of transaction costs to resource value also applies to the cornerstone of 
(barriers to) ex post competition. Of course, costs expended on protecting against 
competition need to be economized.  However, property rights can also be protected  
through such means as establishing private orderings (Williamson 1996), deterring 
entry (Tirole 1988), writing enforceable contracts, adopting sales strategies to avoid 
adverse sorting, as in the DeBeers example (Barzel 1982; Roy and Kenney 1983), and 
the corresponding costs need to be economized, too.   To see that capture goes beyond 
competitive imitation, consider a hypothetical firm that is launching an new 
innovative gizmo.  It produces the gizmo using very complex resource combinations 
that because of the complexity are effectively inimitable.  The gizmo turns out to be a 
huge commercial success. Because of the heavy uncertainty and asymmetric 
information related to the commercial potential of the device, only a fraction of future 
rents have been appropriated by factor markets.  The firm is the only major employer 
in the area, so employees are rather immobile.  Producing the gizmo would seem to be 
“… a value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or 
potential competitors and … these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of 
this strategy” (Barney 1991: 102), that is, to realize a sustained competitive advantage.  
However, all employees receive a flat wage and the company does little to monitor the 
shirking that develops. The shirking eventually becomes so widespread that the 
company’s profitability is on par with its competitors.  
Implication:  Sustainability of competitive advantage depends not only on controlling 
capture in the form of competitive imitation and substitution, but also on other kinds of 
capture such as moral hazard, adverse selection and hold-up.  Estimating sustainability 
must take such capture and the costs of controlling it into account. 
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 Improved understanding of resource heterogeneity.  While TCE ⎯ like the RBV ⎯ 
contains little that helps to explain why firms are ultimately different in the sense that it 
does not deal with entrepreneurship, it provides insight into heterogeneity that goes 
beyond the RBV.  Because of its emphasis on property rights, resources are multi-
dimensional in the TCE.  Thus, a resource is a bundle of property rights to various 
resource attributes, such as uses and functionalities.  Attributes are typically bundled 
into resources because of costs of exchanging individual attributes, including the costs 
of protecting these attributes (Foss and Foss 2001, 2004).   
Implication: Resources are not given, but are outcomes of processes of economizing with 
such transaction costs.  Therefore, what is physically the same resources to different firms 
may economically be different resources, for example, because the relevant firms are not 
equally capable of protecting the relevant attributes.   
For example, licensed technological knowledge may be protected more strongly by 
one firm than by another firm that also licenses the relevant knowledge.  
Economically, the licensed knowledge will be different goods.  
 New resource categories. A TCE perspective directs attention to those resources 
that may be advantages to firms in the sense that they increase created (and 
appropriated) value, that is, specific ways of sorting goods (e.g., in the retailing and 
industries such as fruit and vegetables), sorting customers (e.g., credit classes in 
banking), contracting, the use of private orderings, etc. (Barzel 1997; Williamson 1996).  
The conjecture here is that these resources are important sources of heterogeneity and 
competitive advantages in a number of industries.  However, they have been largely 
neglected in the RBV, perhaps because these resources only exist if a positive 
transaction cost world is assumed. 
IV. Conclusions 
The RBV has proven to be an influential and useful analytical structure for the analysis 
of many strategic issues.  However, it is also like a ten to fifteen years old building that 
was built by a few key contractors on a tight completion deadline and on the basis of 
somewhat different inputs (Foss and Knudsen 2003). Some of the limitations are 
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beginning to show up.  First, the RBV building was constructed on a foundation – the 
competitive equilibrium model – that makes it hard to extend the building.  Second, 
some essential materials – namely transaction costs – were not used to a sufficient 
degree.  A number of deficiencies have resulted, of which some have been sketched 
here.  Accordingly, the repair effort should be a fundamental one, and will have to be 
directed at building a better foundation and adding the essential material of 
transaction costs.  The first kind of repair effort has been initiated by Lippman and 
Rumelt (2003a&b); the second one is that sketched out in the present paper.   Future 
work will concentrate on not just sketching, but actually fleshing out the RBV-TCE 
synthesis.  
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